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I study how choice behavior given unawareness of an event diers from choice
behavior given subjective belief of zero probability on that event. Depending on dif-
ferent types of unawareness the decision-maker suers, behavior under unawareness is
either incomparable with that under zero probability (in the case of pure unawareness),
or drastically dierent (in the case of partial unawareness). The key dierences are
(1) partial unawareness permits dynamically inconsistent choice, while zero probabil-
ity beliefs do not; and (2) there are unforeseen options in an unawareness environment
that are necessarily modeled as dominated options in zero probability models.
Keywords: unawareness, zero probability, dynamic consistency, unforeseen contin-
gency, unforeseen options
JEL Classication: C70, C72, D80, D82, D831 Introduction
It is a well-recognized fact that people may be unaware of some relevant uncertainties
when making decisions. For example, most insurance companies in the 1970s were
unaware of the harmful eects lead-based paint had on the human body, which sub-
sequently resulted in millions of dollars in compensation. The war against terrorism
has been an extremely dicult endeavor precisely because we are unaware of many
possible strategies the terrorists could employ. Thus, understanding decision-making
under unawareness is of great interest.
There are two interesting notions of unawareness. The rst is unawareness of
a specic event, in the sense of not knowing it, and not knowing not knowing it, and
so on. The second is (un)awareness of the general issue of unawareness itself, i.e.,
whether one is aware that there may exist some event of which one is unaware. In
principle, these are separate issues. For example, while the insurance companies in the
1970s were unaware of the harmful eects of lead-based paint, they could have been
aware that they were unaware of something. On the other hand, modeling the latter
necessarily requires embedding the former in the model. In this note, I focus attention
on the case where one is not only unaware of some specic events, but also essentially
unaware of such specic unawareness.
A frequently raised question is whether such unawareness is observationally
equivalent to having full awareness with zero probability beliefs. The question arises
from the observation that while one cannot take into account what happens in events of
which one is unaware, neither does one care about what happens in events to which one
assigns zero probability, as long as one is rational.1 Indeed, this is the approach used
in many papers to model agents with unawareness, for example, Modica, Rustichini
and Tallon (?), and Ozbay (?), among others. On the other hand, there is also a
clear conceptual distinction between unawareness and zero probability that prompts
many economists to explore models of unawareness explicitly. Nonetheless, all existing
models of unawareness deliver results (in terms of behavior and outcomes) that can be
obtained in models with zero-probability beliefs. Thus, the goal of this note is two-
fold: I explore whether zero-probability belief systems are reasonable approximations
of beliefs under unawareness; and what characterizes behavior under unawareness.
Epistemically, unawareness clearly diers from having zero probability beliefs
(?, ?). One is unaware of an event if one doesn't know it, and doesn't know he
doesn't know it, and so on, while assigning zero probability to an event requires being
aware of it. In a decision context, this distinction rst translates to the availability
of corresponding bets. While one cannot bet on an event of which one is unaware,
one can certainly bet on an event to which one assigns zero probability. However, this
observation has no behavioral content: a rational decision-maker (DM) never bets on
an event to which he assigns zero probability anyway.
1In this context, rationality refers to expected utility maximization.
1The second observation is that unawareness has a natural symmetry property
that cannot be satised in a probability system: one is unaware of an event if and
only if one is unaware of the negation of it, but one cannot assign zero probability
to both an event and its negation. It follows that while the DM can bet neither on
nor against an event of which he is unaware, he would always want to bet against an
event to which he assigns zero probability. However, this observation, too, has minimal
behavioral content: testing it requires asking the DM to rank bets involving the event
in question, which necessarily makes the DM aware of it. Moreover, in many situations,
the DM could bet on an event that is equivalent to an event of which he is unaware. For
example, imagine there are red, black and white balls in an urn, but Alex is unaware
of the red balls. Although Alex cannot bet on either \the ball is red" or \the ball is
not red," he could, and presumably would, bet on the event \the ball is either black or
white," just as he would if he assigned zero probability to having red balls in the urn.2
Therefore, I turn to examine the DM's choice behavior with respect to those bets of
which he is aware.
An immediate problem is that, if the DM is unaware of any relevant uncertainty,
then he is also necessarily unaware of all feasible bets. A bet in its regular usage
species an unambiguous outcome for each deterministic scenario, and in that sense,
it is objectively well-specied. Call it an objective bet. In the previous example, an
objective bet species what Alex receives for each color of the ball drawn from the urn.
If Alex is unaware of the red balls, then he must be unaware of all such objective bets.
However, arguably Alex can conceive bets on events such as \black ball" or \white
ball." I call such \bets" perceived by the DM under unawareness the subjective bets.
But a subjective bet is in fact not well-dened from a fully aware outside ob-
server's perspective: there is at least one scenario the DM has in mind when he has
unawareness that is not deterministic. Thus, the DM's ranking of subjective bets
reects both his likelihood assessments of those events of which he is aware and his
perception of the outcome of the bet in each scenario he has in mind. Thus the eects
of unawareness are reected in how the subjective bets are connected with the objec-
tive ones. Consider the following two-period decision process. In the rst period, the
DM ranks all subjective bets; in the second period, the DM is informed of all relevant
uncertainties and then ranks objective bets. Intuitively, each subjective bet the DM
considers in the rst period corresponds to some objective bet he becomes aware of in
the second period, except that under his unawareness in the rst period, the DM is
unable to express those subjective bets precisely. Thus, one would expect the DM to
rank those bets in the same way in both periods.
There are two plausible interpretations of subjective bets. For example, suppose
there are two relevant uncertainties, whether it rains and whether there is an earth-
quake, but Bob is unaware of the possibility of an earthquake. Consider the subjective
2Of course, in the former case, Alex is unaware that his bet is equivalent to one wagering on \the
ball is not red," while in the latter case he knows it.
2bet that says Bob receives $10 if it rains and pays $10 if it does not rain. What does
Bob have in mind when he contemplates such a bet? One possibility is that he assumes
he is to receive $10 whenever it rains and pay $10 whenever it does not rain. In this
case, the DM simply neglects the details of which he is unaware in evaluating subjective
bets. I refer to this case as \pure unawareness." It is not hard to see that the only
implication of pure unawareness is the DM's inability to bet on or form beliefs about
events of which he is unaware. Notice that since one cannot assign zero probability
to both an event and its negation, pure unawareness of an event is incomparable with
assigning zero probability to it.
A second possibility is that Bob implicitly assumes there is no earthquake in
the rst period. Thus, each subjective bet corresponds to some objective bet that
coincides with the subjective bet in states where there is no earthquake and yields
a lottery consisting of only the prizes $10 or -$10 otherwise.3 I refer to this case as
\partial unawareness." Unlike pure unawareness, in this case, the DM not only neglects
some relevant uncertainties in the environment, but also implicitly assigns probability
one to some particular resolution of those uncertainties. Moreover, the DM is unaware
of his making such implicit assumptions. It is this case that begs a comparison with
zero probability.
Notice that under partial unawareness, there is a continuum of objective bets
extending the same subjective bet. However, it seems there is no general rule that
selects a particular objective bet for all partial unawareness. How the DM's partial
unawareness aects his likelihood assessments about events of which he is aware de-
pends on the specic nature of his unawareness. This can be seen clearly in the urn
example, where there is a natural correlation between realizations of dierent uncer-
tainties, and hence the DM's unawareness is necessarily partial unawareness.4 Suppose
Alex is unaware of the red balls because he suers from color blindness that makes him
unable to distinguish red and black. Then upon being told about the red balls, Alex
would realize the event \the ball is black" that he perceives in the rst period actually
confounds two objective events: \the ball is black" and \the ball is red." Consequently,
in comparison to his valuation of the objective bets in the second period, his valuation
of the subjective bets in the rst period must have a systematic bias towards more
weights on the consequences of the state where the ball is black. More specically,
suppose Alex is indierent between not betting and taking the bet \getting $10 if the
ball is black, paying $10 if the ball is white" in the rst period; then he must be in-
dierent between not betting and taking the bet \getting $10 if the ball is black or
red, paying $10 if the ball is white" in the second period. Alternatively, suppose Alex's
color blindness makes him unable to distinguish between red and white instead. Then
it seems that in the second period Alex would be indierent between not betting and
3An implicit assumption here is that there are no unforeseen consequences. I discuss this assump-
tion later.
4Since a ball can only be either black, white, or red, if Alex is unaware of the red balls, he must
implicitly assume no ball is red.
3taking the bet \getting $10 if the ball is black, paying $10 if the ball is white or red"
instead.
On the other hand, partial unawareness does impose some restrictions on the
DM's behavior. Arguably Alex would always prefer to receive the better prize in
states of which he was unaware before in the second period, regardless of the nature
of his unawareness. Thus, in general, it seems plausible for the following axiom to
be satised in the case of partial unawareness: the DM's valuation of a subjective bet
under partial unawareness should fall between his valuation of a best-scenario extension
of the subjective bet and a worst-scenario extension of it upon updating his awareness.5
For example, the axiom says, regardless of what causes Alex's unawareness of the red
balls, his valuation of the subjective bet \receives $10 if the ball is black and pays
$10 if the ball is white" under partial unawareness falls between his valuation of the
objective bets \receives $10 if the ball is black or red and pays $10 if the ball is white"
and \receives $10 if the ball is black and pays $10 if the ball is white or red" under full
awareness.
This axiom leads to the result that the DM's subjective beliefs regarding events
of which he is aware under partial unawareness are bounded below by those under
full awareness. More specically, let 1 and 2 denote the DM's beliefs under partial
unawareness and under full awareness, respectively. Then for any event E that is
measurable with respect to both 1 and 2, one has 1  2.
Such beliefs encompass assigning zero probabilities to the corresponding events
under full awareness. Notice that as long as there is full awareness, new information
must be interpreted as information about which state obtains. I refer to such infor-
mation as factual information. Then one would expect such information to only aect
behavior regarding bets that dier in states for which the new information and the old
information have dierent implications. In other words, the DM's preferences should
satisfy an \event consistency" axiom: as long as two bets coincide in states for which
he has dierent information, the DM's ranking of these bets should be the same de-
spite the dierent information. Myerson (?) shows that this is the key axiom that
characterizes the conditional probability system (CPS), which dictates that for all E
that receives positive probabilities given dierent information, the relative likelihood
remains the same.
In particular, notice that behavior under such beliefs is dynamically consistent:
conditional on the same event, preferences given dierent information coincide. In
contrast, partial unawareness permits dynamic inconsistency: under dierent awareness
5It is worth noting that the dichotomy of pure unawareness and partial unawareness is only mean-
ingful in the context of decision-making. Epistemically, partial unawareness is not fundamentally
dierent from pure unawareness. However, given correlations between realizations of uncertainties,
unawareness of an uncertainty could entail the additional complication of unawareness of logical de-
ductions. For example, not only is Alex unaware of both \the ball is red" and \the ball is not red,"
but he is also unaware that \the ball is black or white" (of which he is aware) is equivalent to \the
ball is not red." See Galanis (?) for a thorough discussion of unawareness of logical deductions.
4levels, the DM may bet dierently conditional on an event of which he is always aware.
Intuitively, expanding the probability space imposes little restrictions on the DM's
relative likelihood assessments on the common set of measurable events because of the
possible correlation between the unforeseen scenarios and the foreseen scenarios. As
a result of becoming aware of the unforeseen scenarios, the DM also becomes aware
of these \hidden" correlations, which may cause him to revise his relative likelihood
assessments regarding events of which he was aware before, and hence reverse his
preferences.
It is worth emphasizing that such dynamic inconsistency due to dierent aware-
ness is very dierent from that in the standard non-expected utilities models (?). First,
intuitively a DM who anticipates that he will be dynamically inconsistent tomorrow
under an expanded awareness would prefer to have tomorrow's preferences instead of
today's if possible, while in the standard models, dynamic inconsistency is always a
problem the DM wants to avoid. In other words, dynamic inconsistency due to dierent
awareness generates a preference for exibility instead of a preference for commitment
in the standard case. Second, under partial unawareness, even though a sophisticated
DM may anticipate that he will be dynamically consistent tomorrow in an abstract
sense, he can never anticipate the specic dynamic inconsistency he will be subject to
and hence cannot fully integrate it into today's decision.
Finally, while unawareness of an event is not behaviorally equivalent to assigning
zero probability to it, it is always possible to model behavior under partial unawareness
by constructing a model involving updating on zero probability. More specically, one
can take the state space to be the disjoint union of S1 and S2, let the DM's preferences
conditional on the information S1 and S2 (appropriately extended to the expanded
domain) match the two period preferences in the unawareness case respectively, and
the preferences conditional on the entire state space reect a subjective belief of zero
probability on S2. Under this construction, the DM is fully aware of all states, including
both the subjective states and the objective states, but rst assigns probability one to
S1 in the rst period, and then upon receiving the information that true state lies in
the prior zero probability event S2, the DM updates to assign probability one to S2.
The caveat of this approach is that beliefs are disjoint by construction and hence are
entirely unrestrictive.
There have few attempts to explore beliefs under unawareness from a decision-
theoretic perspective. Ahn and Ergin (?) explore a model in which the DM's subjec-
tive beliefs for dierent sub-algebras of events are solicited, and the connection between
these beliefs is interpreted as reecting the eects of dierent framings, possibly embed-
ding dierent awareness. In the context of the above example, Ahn and Ergin compare
Bob's subjective beliefs for \rain" and \no rain" with his beliefs for \rain, earthquake,"
\rain, no earthquake" and \no rain," and interpret the discrepancy, if any, between
the probability for \rain" in the rst belief system and the sum of the probabilities for
\rain, earthquake" and \rain, no earthquake" in the second belief system as evidence
that Bob was unaware of earthquake when he ranked only bets measurable with respect
5to only the events \rain" and \no rain." In contrast, in this paper, I compare Bob's
beliefs for \rain" when he is unaware of the earthquake and when he is aware of the
earthquake.
The note is organized as follows. Section ?? investigates how unawareness af-
fects the DM's beliefs regarding events of which he is aware. I discuss both the bench-
mark case of pure unawareness and the main interest, the case of partial unawareness.
Section 3 contrasts the case of unawareness with zero probability models. Section 4
discusses caveats of the decision-theoretic approach and potential interesting issues in
this environment. I conclude in Section 5.
2 Beliefs under Unawareness
Let Z denote an arbitrary set of prizes and (Z) the set of simple lotteries over
Z.6 Let Si denote the state space for period i;i = 1;2. Let S2 be nite. Let <i
denote the DM's preference orderings over the period i choice set Ci = ((Z))Si.
Let i and i denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <i, respectively. Let l
denote a generic element in (Z). Slightly abusing notation, I also use l to denote
the constant act that yields l in every state. As usual, the convex combination of
acts is dened by taking the convex combination state-wise: for all  2 [0;1] and any
f;g 2 Ci;[f + (1   )g](s) = f(s) + (1   )g(s) for all s 2 Si.
Fixing f;g 2 Ci and E  Si, I say the DM prefers f to g conditional on E,
denoted by f <i
E g, if f0 <i g0 where f0(s) = g0(s) for all s = 2 E and f0(s) = f(s) and
g0(s) = g(s) for all s 2 E. An event E  Si is Savage-null under <i if f i
E g for all
f;g 2 Ci. A state s is said to be non-null if fsg is not Savage-null.
First I postulate <i satises the standard Anscomb-Aumann axioms.
AA.1 (weak order): <i is transitive and complete;
AA.2 (continuity): for all g 2 Ci, the sets ff 2 Ci : g <i fg and ff 2 Ci : f <i gg are
closed;
AA.3 (independence): for all f;g;h 2 Ci, f i g; 2 (0;1) implies f + (1   )h i
g + (1   )h;
AA.4 (non-triviality): there exist f;g 2 Ci such that f i g;
AA.5 (state-independence): for all non-null s;t 2 Si, l1 <i
fsg l2 if and only if l1 <i
ftg l2
for all constant acts l1;l2 2 (Z).
6A simple lottery is a lottery that has nite support. For concreteness, think of the set Z as the
real line, representing the monetary payos.
6Proposition 1 (Anscombe and Aumann (1963)): The axioms AA.1-5 are neces-





where ui : (Z) ! R is linear in probabilities and unique up to ane transformation,
and i : 2Si ! [0;1] is the unique subjective probability on Si.
I refer to 2 as the DM's latent beliefs under full awareness and use it as the
reference point in discussing the DM's subjective beliefs under unawareness, 1.
Next I discuss axioms that connect the DM's ranking of subjective bets and his
ranking of objective bets. The rst axiom postulates there are no unforeseen conse-
quences.
U.1 (foreseen consequences): for all l1;l2 2 (Z);l1 <1 l2 () l1 <2 l2.
This axiom says that the induced ranking over all monetary payos are inde-
pendent of the DM's awareness level. Combined with the fact that the set of prizes Z is
xed across periods, this axiom amounts to isolating the eects of the DM's unaware-
ness of uncertain events on the DM's beliefs. One way to think of the model is that
it presents a thought experiment in which beliefs under dierent awareness levels are
solicited using monetary bets. In this context the foreseen consequence axiom seems
natural.
Adding axiom U.1 to AA.1-5 results in setting u1 = u2 = u in the above
representations, which makes it possible to have a direct comparison of beliefs under
dierent awareness levels.7
The key axiom concerns how the DM's subjective bets relate to the objective
ones, for which the most important piece is how the DM's subjective state space relates
to the full state space. I discuss two plausible cases of unawareness.
2.1 Pure unawareness.
Given a subjective bet f, if the DM interprets f as the bet that yields f(s) whenever
the situation described in the subjective state s 2 S1 is true without making any other
assumptions, explicitly or implicitly, then I say the DM has pure unawareness.
To model pure unawareness, I let S2 = S1  U, where U is a non-singleton
set. The interpretation is U contains all possible resolutions of those uncertainties
of which the DM is unaware. For example, one can represent Bob's subjective state
space by S1 = fr;nrg, where r;nr represent \rain" and \no rain," respectively. Bob
7Technically, the DM's Bernoulli utility for lotteries and his beliefs over the state space are jointly
identied from his preferences over acts. Fixing the utility numbers are necessary to pin down the
DM's beliefs.
7is unaware of the uncertainty of whether there is earthquake, for which there are two
possible resolutions and can be denoted by e;ne. The full state space is represented
by S2 = fr;nrg  e;ne. Intuitively, the singleton subjective event frg is a coarser
description of the event frg  fe;neg in the full state space.
Each subjective bet is identied by one and only one objective bet. Let G :
C1 ! C2 be dened as follows: for any f 2 C1, G(f)((s;u))  f(s) for all s 2 S1 and
u 2 U. Thus, pure awareness amounts to the following axiom:
U.2 (pure unawareness): for any f;g 2 C1, f <1 g , G(f) <2 G(g).
Proposition 2 Axioms AA.1-5 and U.1-2 are necessary and sucient for <i;i = 1;2;
to be represented as in (??), and in addition, (1) u1 = u2; (2) for all E  S1, 1(E) =
2(E  U).
The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Proposition ?? says pure unawareness is equivalent to a measurability constraint:
the DM's preferences over the subjective bets are identied by a subset of his prefer-
ences over the objective bets. The DM's subjective beliefs under pure unawareness are
the restriction of his latent beliefs on events of which he is aware. In terms of the DM's
choice behavior, the only implication of pure unawareness is the incompleteness of his
choice set. Pure unawareness is simply not comparable to assigning zero probability.
2.2 Partial unawareness.
Alternatively, the DM's unawareness may be associated with some implicit assumptions
about the underlying state of the world, and hence the DM perceives the lottery f(s)
to realize in some particular situation where not only the description of s is true but
also the implicit assumptions are true. In the earthquake example, Bob may implicitly
assume there is no earthquake. In the urn example, Alex is necessarily assuming the
ball is not red. In a sense, each subjective state the DM has in mind corresponds to
a particular full state, and hence the DM's subjective state space can be viewed as a
subset of the full state space, i.e., the set of states where his implicit assumptions are
true. I refer to this case as partial unawareness.8
Let S2 = S1 [ Up, where Up 6= ;. Upon revelation of the full state space
in the second period, the DM becomes aware of his own implicit assumption and
reassesses every event with respect to the expanded universal event. Fix a subjective
bet f 2 C1. From an outside observer's perspective, f leaves consequences in states
in Up unspecied, while from the unaware DM's perspective, all scenarios have been
8The DM is actually unaware of his implicit assumptions, so strictly speaking, the DM's subjective
state space should be disjoint with the full state space, just as in the pure unawareness case. A
subjective state, technically, is a pair (s;S1), consisting of the state and the \subjective state space"
that represents the implicit assumption under partial unawareness. See Li (?) for details.
8considered. Since in this model, the DM evaluates monetary bets on the likelihood
of uncertain events, even though there is unawareness of the uncertainties, there is
no unawareness of the possible monetary payos. The DM knows that by choosing
f he will receive a lottery in the set ff(s) : s 2 S1g. Intuitively, the DM implicitly
\confounds" scenarios described in Up when reasoning about his subjective states in
S1. Thus, I say an objective bet g 2 C2 is an extension of f, or g extends f, if
g(s) = f(s) for all s 2 S1 and g(s) 2 ff(s) : s 2 S1g for all s 2 Up. Absent additional
assumptions about the nature of the DM's partial unawareness, that the DM perceives
each subjective bet to be some objective extension of it seems to be the only thing that
one can say.
Let l1[E]l2[SinE] denote the (subjective or objective) bet that yields the lottery
l1 on the event E and l2 on its complement Si n E. Given any f 2 Ci, let  f denote
its certainty equivalent under <i (which exists by the Anscomb-Aumann axioms), i.e.,
 f 2 (Z) is the constant act such that f i  f.
U.3 (partial unawareness): for all E  S1, l1 1 l2,
l1[E [ Up]l2[S1 n E] <
2 l1[E]l2[S1 n E] <
2 l1[E]l2[S2 n E]: (y)
This axiom essentially says that the DM's valuation of a subjective bet falls
between its best-scenario extension and worst-scenario extension. To see this, notice
l1[E]l2[S1 n E] is the certainty equivalent of the subjective bet l1[E]l2[S1nE] and serves
as a \price tag" for the latter that can be taken to the second period for comparison.
The objective bet l1[E [ Up]l2[S1 n E] is the best-scenario extension of l1[E]l2[S1 n E],
assigning the better lottery l1 to the DM in all states in Up, while l1[E]l2[S2 nE] is the
worst-scenario extension, assigning the worse lottery l2 to the DM in all states in Up.
Proposition 3 Axioms AA.1-5, U.1 and U.3 are necessary and sucient for <i;i =
1;2; to be represented as in (??), and in addition, (1) u1 = u2; (2) for all E  S1,
1(E)  2(E). Moreover, 1 = 2 if and only if Up is Savage-null under <2.




Fix s 2 S1 and let l1 1 l2. By U.3, we have:
1(s)u(l1) + (1   1(s))u(l2)  2(s)u(l1) + (1   2(s))u(l2):
The expression is monotonic in the probabilities, and hence we have 1(s)  2(s).
This is true for every s 2 S1.
Suppose Up is Savage-null under <2. Then for all E  S1, l1[E[Up]l2[S1nE] 2
l1[E]l2[S2 n E]. By axiom U.3, we have l1[E]l2[S1 n E] 2 l1[E]l2[S2 n E], which then
indicates 1(E)u(l1) + (1   1(E))u(l2) = 2(E)u(l1) + (1   2(E))u(l2). It follows
1(E) = 2(E).
9For the converse, observe that 2(S1) = 1(S1) = 1 implies S nS1 is Savage-null
under <2. 
Thus, absent additional assumptions regarding the nature of unawareness, be-
liefs under partial unawareness are rather unrestrictive. For example, suppose Bob's
latent beliefs are such that each color has probability 1
3; then, being partially unaware
of red balls, Bob's subjective beliefs can be anything that assigns a probability between
1
3 and 2
3 to the ball being black and to the ball being white, respectively.
On the ip side, beliefs under unawareness have little implication for how the
DM updates his beliefs upon expanding his awareness level, too. The DM's beliefs
under partial unawareness only put upper bounds on his beliefs under an expanded
awareness. In particular, the relative likelihood of events is completely unrestrictive.
Among other things, this means the DM will in general be dynamically inconsistent,
in the sense that upon expanding awareness but conditional on the set of foreseen
scenarios, the preferences could reverse. More specically, as long as there exist two





S16=<1, that is, there exist
f;g 2 C2;f(s) = g(s) for all s 2 Up, gjS1 <1 fjS1, but f 2 g.
3 Partial Unawareness and Zero Probability Beliefs
Partial unawareness begs the comparison with zero probability belief under full aware-
ness; i.e., the DM is always aware of S2 but simply assigns zero probability to Up in
the rst period. Then the key question is how one interprets the informational content
of the signal S2. I consider three cases.
First, consider the standard interpretation that S2 is the signal that all states
in S2 are possible. Given the DM's full awareness of S2, such information is trivial. To
recast the previous model in this story, one can view the rst-period preferences <1
over C1 as resulting from omitting the null-event Up, while in the second period, the
DM is asked to explicitly rank all available bets in S2. Obviously, partial unawareness
encompasses this case of naive probability zero.
One can argue that the above is not the relevant comparison, because in the
case of unawareness, S2 is an informative signal, while in the above story, S2 is not.
Thus, a more desirable comparison is to reinterpret S2 as new information that somehow
induces the DM to update his beliefs and assign a positive probability to Up. Note that,
in this case, S2 is not information in the standard usage of this term: it expands the
set of non-null states instead of narrowing it. However, no matter what interpretation
one gives to the signal S2, it diers from S1 only in the event Up. Thus, for any two
bets f;g that coincide on Up, the new information has no implications, and hence the
DM should rank them in the same way.
Z.1 (event consistency): let f;g 2 C2 be such that f(s) = g(s) for all s 2 Up, then
fjS1 <1 gjS1 ) f <2 g.
10Proposition 4 (Myerson (?)): Axioms AA.1-5 and Z.1 are necessary and sucient
for <i;i = 1;2; to be represented as in (??), and in addition, u1 = u2; 1(s) = 2(sjS1).
That is, the rst-period beliefs are conditional probabilities. Note Z.1 implies
U.3, so again partial unawareness encompasses this case. In terms of behavior, Z.1
characterizes dynamic consistency: conditional on events in S1, the DM's preferences
remain the same regardless of his information.
How to understand this? Intuitively, there is a fundamental conceptual dier-
ence between updating on new factual information, i.e., information about which events
obtain, and updating on new awareness information, i.e., information on which events
should be included in the probability space. Given state-independent preferences for
lotteries, choices are naturally additively separable in events under dierent factual
information, due to the fact that states are mutually exclusive. However, when there
is partial unawareness, the problem is precisely the DM's inability to separate states
and hence events. New awareness information is not about revealing relevant facts, but
rather, it is about revealing the hidden correlation between those states of which the
DM is aware. Consequently, while dynamic consistency characterizes rational choice
behavior under dierent factual information, dynamic inconsistency tends to arise in
environments involving partial unawareness.
Notice that the dynamic inconsistency due to partial unawareness is very dier-
ent from the one in standard non-expected utility models. In standard models, dynamic
inconsistency tends to be an undesirable consequence of lack of self-control that the
DM would like to avoid, while in the case of partial unawareness, if anything, the DM
would like to make room for such dynamic inconsistency to occur because these are the
choices made with better information. Using the language of the multi-selves story, in
the rst case, today's DM prefers to make decisions for his future selves, while in the
second case, today's DM prefers to be his future self and would like to leave room for
his future self to override his own decision today. The rst case leads to a preference
for a commitment device, while the second case leads to a preference for exibility.
Second, in an unawareness environment, a sophisticated DM may anticipate himself
to be dynamically inconsistent, but he will not be able to predict specically how his
preferences will change with expanded awareness. Awareness information, by deni-
tion, is beyond the DM. Thus, there is necessarily uncertainty as to how his preferences
will change tomorrow, and the DM is necessarily \fuzzy" about such uncertainty.9 In
contrast, in standard models, the DM perceives all possible scenarios and anticipates
precisely how his preferences change in each scenario.
Finally, I note that while unawareness of an event diers from assigning zero
probability to an event per se, one can always write down some model of zero probability
9In a seminal paper, Kreps (?) studies a DM who exhibits preference for exibility, anticipating
possible changes of preferences, and later reinterprets the work as a model of unforeseen contingencies
(?).
11that matches the behavior under unawareness.10 The idea is to construct a state space
encompassing both S1 and S2 and reinterpreting the DM's preferences in the two
periods as conditioning on disjoint events. More specically, given <i over Ci;i = 1;2,
I can dene another model  a la Myerson (?) as follows. Let S be the disjoint union
of S1 and S2, and C = ((Z))S be the choice set for both periods. For all f;g 2 C,
dene f <S g if and only if fjS1 <i gjS1, and f <S2 g if and only if fjS2 <i gjS2. Then
one can view the two-period belief system as a conditional probability system (CPS)
 : 2S fS;S2g ! [0;1], such that (S2jS) = 0.11 Intuitively, this model describes the
following: On the expanded state space S, the DM has a prior belief of zero probability
on S2. In the second period, the DM receives the zero-probability signal S2 and updates
his beliefs to assign probability 1 to S2 instead.
The caveat of this approach is that, given disjoint beliefs in the two periods,
behavior can be made to match anything one wishes. Therefore, to give this model
any content, one needs to impose additional structures that capture the essence of
unawareness, for example, the counterparts of U.2-3. But doing this necessarily requires
one to examine a model of unawareness, which defeats the very purpose of writing a
zero probability model for unawareness.
4 Discussion
In this section, I discuss the limitations of this model, in particular those imposed by
the standard decision-theoretic framework itself, as well as some conceptual issues of
unawareness.
4.1 Unawareness and (bounded) rationality.
In this paper, unawareness is treated as an informational constraint. There is a sense in
saying that the DM in this model is perfectly rational with respect to his own aware-
ness: He forms probabilistic beliefs about relevant uncertain events and maximizes
subjective expected utilities under such beliefs. He is also Bayesian within the bound-
ary of his awareness. In particular, unlike the standard model, dynamic inconsistency
under partial unawareness reects the DM's rationality rather than bounded ratio-
nality: Whenever there is correlation between resolutions of aware uncertainties and
unaware uncertainties, states in the subjective state space are either not mutually ex-
clusive or not exhaustive, which the DM, if rational, should recognize upon expanding
his awareness.
10Note this construction surpasses both pure unawareness and partial unawareness.
11Fix a nite state space 
. A CPS is any function  : 2
  2
 n f;g ! [0;1] such that, for all
X;Y;Z  
; Z 6= ;, (jZ) is a probability measure over 
 such that (1) (
jZ) = (ZjZ) = 1; (2)
X  Y  Z; Y 6= ; ) (XjZ) = (XjY )(Y jZ).
124.2 Unforeseen consequences.
As pointed out earlier, this model is best viewed as a thought experiment designed to
solicit beliefs under dierent awareness levels. A key device is the use of monetary bets,
which removes unforeseen consequences from consideration. Notice this assumption
does impose extra burden on another axiom, namely, the state-independence axiom,
by postulating that the DM's preferences for money do not depend on the states, even
the unforeseen ones.
It is worth mentioning that this model does not provide a choice theory foun-
dation for decision-making under unawareness. The main problem is that the choice
objects in real life are usually options, not acts. The mapping between options and
acts is typically taken as given in standard models. For example, in a typical model,
the DM chooses between a set of risky projects, and the outcomes of these projects in
each (subjective) state are known. This is a reasonable simplication when full aware-
ness is assumed, but it becomes problematic when unawareness is involved. Intuitively,
unforeseen contingencies give rise to unforeseen consequences. For example, suppose
Bob's decision problem is to choose a vacation plan in California. Being unaware of
the possibility of an earthquake, presumably he would also be unaware of the inuence
of an earthquake (or the lack of) on his vacation plans. Upon expanding his awareness,
Bob also updates his perception of the travel plans in terms of the corresponding acts
in his choice set. In particular, this implies in general that the act representing an
option when the DM has more awareness is not an extension of the act representing
the same option when the DM has less awareness. In other words, real life choices
tend to confound both unawareness of contingencies and unawareness of consequences,
which makes it dicult to disentangle beliefs from preferences for nal outcomes.
4.3 Unforeseen options.
While the model focuses on the implications of unawareness with respect to the set of
subjective bets, or foreseen options, the most salient feature in the unawareness envi-
ronment is actually an incomplete choice set, i.e., the unavailability of bets on events
of which the DM is unaware.12 For a simple example, suppose Charlie is contemplating
the choice problem of whether to go for a walk in the park. If he is unaware of the pos-
sibility of rain, then the option \take a walk in the park with an umbrella," which could
well be the option that he prefers the most had he been aware of rain, will simply not
occur to him. The presence of such unforeseen options gives rise to a novel issue that
is entirely dierent from those in the standard model; that is, ex ante, it is not possible
to specify a contingent plan that yields the best option in each scenario. In contrast,
in any standard model with full awareness, the choice set is complete, and hence the
12One immediate implication is that, even if the DM is irrational, whatever it means, he will never
bet on an event of which he is unaware, but an irrational DM could certainly bet on an event to which
he assigns zero probability.
13best option is always conceivable ex ante. In this sense there are true dynamics in an
unawareness environment: optimal decisions can only be made after the arrival of new
information. However, since the choice set is the primitives of any standard decision
theory model, modeling a DM who contemplates the incompleteness of his choice set
may require a drastic departure from the standard approach.
5 Conclusion
While unawareness is a realistic cognitive restriction that seems to have broad impli-
cations in many important economic situations, it is commonly regarded to be behav-
iorally equivalent to having zero probability beliefs in economic models. In this paper,
I carefully compare, in an axiomatic decision theory framework, the case of unaware-
ness and models of zero probability beliefs. I show that, on the one hand, unawareness
does have implications for one's beliefs with respect to events of which one is aware;
on the other hand, such restrictions are rather weak, yielding beliefs that have much
less structure than those involving assigning zero probabilities to corresponding events.
The axiomatic framework also enables me to organize novel issues brought up by un-
awareness, as well as point out which implicit assumptions of the standard decision
theory models will have to be relaxed in order to address them. Dekel, Lipman and
Rustichini (?) point out the need of \(nding) an `Ellsbergian paradox' that indicates
behaviors that are due to unforeseen contingencies and that conict with standard sub-
jective (non)expected utility models, thus helping focus the search for alternatives."
While this note does not provide such a \Ellsbergian paradox," it points out struc-
tural assumptions in the standard models that preclude producing such a paradox,
and possible directions where one may nd one.
References
Ahn, David S. and Haluk Ergin, \Framing Contingencies," 2007. Working paper.
Dekel, Eddie, Barton L. Lipman, and Aldo Rustichini, \Recent Developments
in Modeling Unforeseen Contingencies," European Economic Review, 1998b, 42,
523{542.
Galanis, Spyros, \Unawareness of Theorems," 2006. Working paper, University of
Rochester.
Kreps, David M., \A Representation Theorem for \Preference for Flexibility","
Econometrica, 1979, 47, 565{576.
14, \Static Choice in the Presence of Unforeseen Contingencies," in Partha Das-
gupta, Douglas Gale, Oliver Hart, and Eric Maskin, eds., Economic Analysis of
Markets and Games, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992.
Li, Jing, \Modeling Unawareness in Arbitrary State Spaces," 2008a. PIER working
paper 08-021.
, \Information Structures with Unawareness," 2008b. PIER working paper 08-024.
Machina, Mark J., \Dynamic Consistency and Non-Expected Utility Models of
Choice Under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Literature, 1989, 27, 1622{1668.
Modica, Salvatore, Aldo Rustichini, and Jean-Marc Tallon, \Unawareness and
Bankruptcy: A General Equilibrium Model," Economic Theory, 1997, 12, 259{
292.
Myerson, Roger, \Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory," 1986. Dis-
cussion Paper No. 671, the Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and
Management Science, Northwestern University.
Ozbay, Erkut Y., \Unawareness and Strategic Announcements in Games with Un-
certainty," 2006. Working paper.
15